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Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness 
 
Abstract:  In this paper, we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS influences the 
flow of firm-specific information and contributes to stock price informativeness as 
measured by stock return synchronicity.  Using a constant sample of 1,904 mandatory 
IFRS adopters in 14 EU countries for the period 2003-2007, we find a V-shaped pattern 
in synchronicity around IFRS adoption, which is consistent with IFRS disclosures 
revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period (i.e., a reduction of 
synchronicity) and subsequently lowering the surprise of future disclosures (i.e., an 
increase in synchronicity). We also find mandatory IFRS adoption increases analysts’ 
ability to incorporate industry-level information into stock price. However, we are unable 
to detect a reduction in the private information advantage enjoyed by institutional owners 
post-IFRS adoption.  Moreover, we find the synchronicity effects to be more pronounced 
for firms in countries with larger differences in local GAAP relative to IFRS.  Overall, 
our evidence yields novel insights on the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption by 
investigating its effect on stock price informativeness and the distinctive roles played by 
a firm’s information environment. 
 
Keywords: IFRS, mandatory adoption; stock return synchronicity; information 
environment. 
 




Mandatory IFRS Reporting and Stock Price Informativeness 
1. Introduction 
The mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 
listed enterprises in the European Union (EU) in 2005 represents a significant regulatory 
reporting change without historical precedent.1  In this paper, we provide evidence on 
how the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU influences the incorporation of 
information into stock prices.  Specifically, we examine the behavior of stock return 
synchronicity (idiosyncratic volatility) around the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the EU.  
Moreover, we investigate the effect of analysts and institutional investors on stock return 
synchronicity around mandatory IFRS adoption.  We further examine whether 
differences in accounting standards prior to mandatory IFRS adoption play a significant 
role in how firm-specific information is incorporated into stock prices around IFRS 
adoption.  
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the first time mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
the EU in 2005 led to a significant increase in disclosed information because firms not 
only explained transition effects due to the use of IFRS but also disclosed more footnotes 
about segments, pensions, share-based payments, and other transactions that were not 
required to be disclosed under local GAAP (e.g., Hall 2008; Hughes 2008).  Reports by 
Big Four auditing firms on IFRS implementation (e.g., KPMG 2006; Ernst & Young 
2007; PwC/IPSOS Mori 2007) highlight increased disclosure and improved 
comparability as a result of IFRS.  We argue that as a result of more information 
                                                 
1 In the current paper, we use the term IFRS to refer to all standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Committee or the committee’s successor, the International Accounting Standards Board, even 




disclosures required under IFRS and enhanced comparability, the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS potentially alters the incentives to collect and share information, which affects both 
common and private information flow and hence stock return synchronicity.   
We focus on stock return synchronicity because prior research (e.g., Ferreira and 
Laux 2007) has identified it as a good candidate for a summary of information flow.  
More recent research (e.g., Hutton et al. 2009) shows that an earnings-based opacity 
measure is associated with higher stock return synchronicity (equivalently, lower firm-
specific return variation), indicating less revelation of firm-specific information.  
Moreover, our interest in the pattern of stock return synchronicity around mandatory 
IFRS adoption stems from prior research (e.g., Tobin 1984; Morck et al. 2000; Durnev et 
al. 2003; Wurgler 2000) that views stock price as an important signal for asset allocation 
and regards stock price informativeness as crucial for efficient asset allocation. 
Our inquiry is motivated by recent theory which emphasizes the role of 
information markets on asset price movements.  We apply Dasgupta et al.’s (2010) 
framework to the mandatory IFRS reporting in the EU to derive testable predictions.  
Dasgupta et al. (2010) present a theoretical model that predicts a decrease in 
synchronicity at the time more firm-specific new information is disclosed and impounded 
into stock prices.  However, the model also predicts a subsequent increase in 
synchronicity because the new information allows investors not only to improve their 
predictions about the occurrence of future firm-specific events but also to incorporate the 
likelihood of occurrence of these future events into stock prices.  Consequently, when 
these events actually happen in the future, investors react less to such news, making stock 
prices more synchronous.  Consistent with their predictions, Dasgupta et al. (2010) 
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document this dynamic synchronicity response to two equity-related events, namely 
seasoned equity offerings and U.S. cross-listings. In our context, mandatory IFRS 
adoption is the event associated with a significant increase in disclosed information (e.g., 
KPMG 2006).  Similar to Dasgupta et al (2010), we predict a decrease in synchronicity in 
response to mandatory IFRS adoption, and a subsequent increase in synchronicity in the 
post-IFRS adoption period.  
Next we investigate the influence of two informed market participants, namely 
financial analysts and institutional investors, on the predicted synchronicity patterns 
around mandatory IFRS adoption.2  Prior research (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; 
Ramnath 2002) has found that financial analysts are likely to increase the amount of 
industry-level information in prices because of their ability to better interpret and 
disseminate common information across all firms in the industry.  Therefore, to the extent 
that mandatory adoption of IFRS enhanced the comparability of financial reports among 
firms, we expect the effect of greater analyst activity on stock return synchronicity to be 
more pronounced in both the year of mandatory IFRS adoption and in the post-IFRS 
adoption period.  In contrast, institutional investors possess an information advantage 
arising from greater monitoring and increased access to private firm-specific information 
(Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Xu and Malkiel 2003).  To the extent that mandatory 
IFRS adoption resulted in more timely and more extensive disclosures, the effect of 
higher levels of institutional holdings on synchronicity may be attenuated in both the year 
of mandatory IFRS adoption and in the post-IFRS adoption period because of reduced 
institutional information advantage. 
                                                 
2 In Graham et al.’s (2005) survey of 401 financial executives, about 90% of them view institutional 
investors, followed by analysts, as the most important group in terms of setting company stock price. 
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Finally, we examine whether the predicted synchronicity patterns depend on the 
degree to which the accounting rules in a country change with the mandatory switch to 
IFRS.  Firms from countries with a large difference between local GAAP and IFRS are 
likely to experience a more ‘lumpy’ information shock at the time of mandatory IFRS 
adoption than those from countries with a small difference between local GAAP and 
IFRS.  Therefore, the decrease in stock return synchronicity in the year of first-time IFRS 
reporting and the subsequent increase in synchronicity in the post-IFRS adoption period 
are likely to be the largest for firms from countries with the large differences in local 
GAAP versus IFRS. 
We use an interrupted time-series design to test our predictions on a constant 
sample of 1,904 mandatory IFRS adopters with December fiscal year-end across 14 EU 
countries.  Turning to our empirical results, we observe an average 8 percent decrease in 
stock return synchronicity in the year of mandatory IFRS adoption, and an increase of 36 
percent in the post-adoption period (compared to the pre-IFRS period).  When we control 
for synchronicity determinants identified in prior research, we continue to find stock 
return synchronicity went down in the year of mandatory IFRS adoption and 
subsequently increased in the post-adoption years to levels higher than in the pre-
adoption period.  In other words, mandatory adoption of IFRS influenced the flow of 
firm-specific information and contributed to a V-shaped pattern in synchronicity around 
the adoption year, a finding that is consistent with the theoretical framework of Dasgupta 
et al. (2010).  
We also find that greater analyst activity had a positive effect on synchronicity 
but only so in the post-IFRS adoption years, which is consistent with the notion that 
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analysts were able to better interpret and disseminate common information across all 
firms in the industry after the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  However, we find no 
evidence that higher levels of institutional holdings affected stock return synchronicity 
differently in the year of mandatory IFRS adoption or in the post-IFRS adoption years, 
which suggests that the mandatory adoption of IFRS did not alter the private information 
advantage enjoyed by institutional investors.   
Finally, when we split the sample based on the number of differences between 
local GAAP and IFRS on 21 important accounting rules identified by Bae et al. (2008), 
we find that the V-shaped synchronicity effect is most pronounced for firms domiciled in 
countries where local GAAP differs more from IFRS. This result is consistent with 
mandatory IFRS adoptions contributing the largest effects where information flows are 
potentially most affected.  To further substantiate that our results are due to mandatory 
IFRS adoption and not to some uncontrolled-for time-varying factor, we partition our 
sample based on the 2004 IFRS-local GAAP earnings per share reconciliation amounts. 
Results of this subsample analysis indicate that mandatory IFRS adopters with large 
earnings per share reconciliations experience the greatest drop in stock return 
synchronicity during the adoption year, highlighting the importance of cross-sectional 
differences in earnings numbers resulting from the mandatory IFRS adoption  
As an additional robustness check, we test how our measure of stock price 
informativeness relates to the amount of firm-specific information around earnings 
announcements.  Our results indicate that the larger our synchronicity measures are, the 
weaker the trading volume and return volatility response around earnings announcements 
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are, suggesting that our synchronicity measures capture the extent of firm-specific 
information capitalization into stock prices. 
Overall, our paper documents the dynamic response of stock return synchronicity 
to mandatory IFRS adoption and helps to understand one factor that can contribute to the 
stock price formation process, namely a mandated harmonization of financial reporting 
standards.  Prior empirical research has examined how stock return synchronicity is 
related to either accounting systems or voluntary IFRS adoptions.  However, the evidence 
on this relation is somewhat mixed.  Using a cross-country research design, Morck et al. 
(2000) find that the sophistication of a country’s local GAAP does not explain 
synchronous stock price movements.  Kim and Shi (2010) find that voluntary IFRS 
adoption in 34 countries over the 1998-2004 time period decreases stock return 
synchronicity and that this effect is attenuated for firms with high analyst following.  To 
our knowledge, however, no previous research has examined the relation between stock 
return synchronicity and mandatory IFRS adoption.  Our results show that mandatory 
adoption of IFRS influenced stock return synchronicity in EU countries, which suggests 
that the first time mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 altered capital market information 
flows.  
Our study also contributes to extant research on the consequences of IFRS.  Using 
data from the first few annual reports released under the new regime, Daske et al. (2008) 
show that market liquidity and equity valuations increase around the time of mandatory 
introduction of IFRS across 26 countries (including 18 EU countries).  However, they 
find mixed evidence regarding the effects of IFRS on the cost of equity capital.  Li (2010) 
focuses exclusively on EU countries and finds that mandatory adopters experience a 
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significant reduction in the cost of equity capital in the year of mandatory introduction of 
IFRS.  In the current study, we are able to provide evidence on how mandatory IFRS 
adoption affects information flows over a longer time period.   
Finally, our study highlights the role of several key elements of the information 
environment and how these elements interact with accounting standards.  Bushman et al. 
(2004) conceptualize a firm’s information environment as a multifaceted system whose 
components collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information.  In the 
current study, we document whether two informed market participants, financial analysts 
and institutional owners, interact with the change in standards to affect stock return 
synchronicity even further.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the 
related literature and develops our testable hypotheses.  Section 3 discusses the sample 
and section 4 details the empirical methods.  In section 5, we present empirical results.  
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2.  Hypothesis Development 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) predict that improving the cost-benefit trade-off on 
private information collection leads to more extensive informed trading and to more 
informative pricing.  Jin and Myers (2006) develop a theory linking managerial 
opportunism, transparency, and firm-specific return variation that supports this 
interpretation.  They argue that transparency affects the division of risk bearing between 
managers and investors.  For example, in more transparent firms, insiders take on less 
firm-specific risk, while outsiders bear less market risk.  As a result, more firm-specific 
disclosure results in a firm’s stock price reflecting more firm-specific information and 
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less stock return synchronicity.  Jin and Myers (2006) find evidence consistent with this 
cross-sectional prediction.  
In a time series setting, Dasgupta et al. (2010) show that stock return 
synchronicity can increase when transparency improves.  In particular, when the 
information environment surrounding a firm improves as more firm-specific information 
is disclosed, stock return synchronicity will initially decrease, which is consistent with Jin 
and Myers (2006).  However, to the extent market participants are able to improve their 
predictions about the occurrence of future firm-specific events from the disclosure of 
time-varying firm-specific information (or disclosure of time-invariant information about 
firm characteristics), stock return synchronicity will subsequently increase.3  Dasgupta et 
al. document this dynamic synchronicity pattern for two equity issuance events, namely 
seasoned equity issues and listing of ADRs, which are associated with significant 
amounts of new or additional information disclosure (e.g., Lang et al. 2003). 
In this study, we examine the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe, an event 
that has been argued to be associated with increased disclosure and enhanced 
comparability (Daske et al., 2008; Li 2010).  EU-listed firms were required to publish 
their financial reports according to IFRS when they reported their 2005 performance (EC 
Regulation 1606/2002).  Some firms disseminated the information early that year through 
interim reports, press releases, and documents explaining transition effects, while others 
waited until the release of the fully IFRS compliant reports (Christensen et al. 2009).  
Since IFRS typically requires more information to be disclosed, such as footnotes about 
                                                 
3 While theory predicts the direction of stock return synchronicity over time to the release of new 
information, it provides little guidance on the magnitude of the effects on synchronicity associated with 




segments, pensions and share-based payments, first-time IFRS reporting is analogous to 
Dasgupta et al.’s characterization of ‘lumpy’ new information being released.4  The 
implication is that the lumpy one-time IFRS information reveals new firm-specific 
information in the adoption year and enables market participants to improve their 
predictions about the occurrence of future firm-specific events, thereby lowering the 
surprise of future disclosures.  Using Dasgupta et al.’s framework, the prediction is that 
stock return synchronicity first decreases in the year of first-time IFRS reporting and 
subsequently increases.  Hypotheses 1a and 1b can be formally stated as follows: 
H1a: Stock return synchronicity decreases in the period of first-time IFRS-
compliant reporting, ceteris paribus. 
 
H1b: Stock return synchronicity increases in the period following the first-time 
IFRS-compliant reporting, ceteris paribus. 
 
Next, we investigate the influence of financial analysts on the predicted 
synchronicity patterns around mandatory IFRS adoption.  Prior studies focusing on the 
information content of analyst recommendations at the firm level provide evidence on the 
analysts’ role in security price formation.  For example, empirical studies by Womack 
(1996) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) document that analyst recommendations convey useful 
firm-specific information.  Others (e.g., Easley et al. 1998) argue that because analysts 
make their reports known to a range of investors, the accessibility of these reports may 
serve to turn private information into public information.  Brennan et al. (1993) find that 
the returns on stocks followed by many analysts lead those of stocks followed by few 
analysts.  More recently, Howe et al. (2009) find that aggregate analyst recommendations 
                                                 
4 We recognize that mandatory IFRS adoption affects multiple firms in the same time span, potentially 
influencing market returns, return volatility, and risk factor pricings. In our empirical models, we therefore 
build in sufficient controls to isolate the price formation effects of lumpy information that enters the market 
via first-time IFRS reporting. 
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not only predict future earnings but also have information value for future market and 
industry returns.  
Prior research (e.g., Chan and Hameed 2006; Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; 
Ramnath 2002) has also found that financial analysts are likely to increase the amount of 
industry-level information in prices because of their ability to better interpret and 
disseminate common information across all firms in the industry.  In other words, analyst 
activity – intuitively thought as increasing the firm-specific component of information – 
actually has a positive impact on stock return synchronicity.  Hameed et al. (2010) 
provide an explanation for this in that widely followed stocks may exhibit more co-
movement because they are priced more accurately, and are therefore used to infer values 
for more opaque stocks.  
Further, Horton et al. (2008) and Byard et al. (2010) find that the information 
environment, as proxied by analyst forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion, improved 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  Thus, to the extent financial analysts become even 
better in disseminating common information across all firms in the industry after the 
mandatory IFRS adoption, we expect the effect of greater analyst activity on stock return 
synchronicity to be more pronounced in both the year of mandatory IFRS adoption and in 
the post-IFRS adoption period.  Hypotheses 2a and 2b can be formally stated as follows: 
H2a: The positive stock return synchronicity effect of high analyst activity is 
intensified in the period of first-time IFRS-compliant reporting, ceteris paribus. 
 
H2b: The positive stock return synchronicity effect of high analyst activity is 
intensified in the period following the first-time IFRS-compliant reporting, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Next, we consider the effect of institutional ownership on stock return 
synchronicity around IFRS adoption.  Institutional trading is another important channel 
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through which information is incorporated into stock prices.  Prior research suggests that   
institutional investors contribute to private information collection and trading because 
they spend substantial resources on information research (Hartzell and Starks 2003; 
Chemmanur et al. 2009).  Other studies also point to the informational advantage of 
institutional investors over other investors due to their greater monitoring abilities 
(Carleton et al. 1998; Nofsinger and Sias 1999).  The implication is that institutional 
investors may reduce stock return synchronicity (equivalently, increase the relative flow 
of firm-specific information).5   
In our context, it is possible that a mandatory switch to IFRS may not attenuate 
private information trading by institutional investors because this investor group is likely 
to continue to keep its information advantage through active interaction and involvement 
with companies (Balsam et al. 2002; Collins et al. 2003; Ke and Petroni 2004).  In other 
words, even if mandatory IFRS adoption increases the total information flow released to 
the market, it does not necessarily eliminate the information advantage of the institutional 
investors.  However, recent research (e.g. Florou and Pope 2009; Yu 2009) finds that 
institutional investors increased their participations in IFRS adopting firms, suggesting 
that the information environment after the mandatory adoption of IFRS was perceived as 
higher quality.  To the extent that mandatory IFRS adoption resulted in more timely and 
more extensive disclosures (Deloitte 2005, KPMG 2006), the effect of higher levels of 
institutional holdings on synchronicity may be attenuated in both the year of mandatory 
IFRS adoption and in the post-IFRS adoption period because of reduced institutional 
information advantage.  The net effect of institutional holdings on stock price 
                                                 
5 This information advantage is different from the one financial analysts experience in that institutional 
investors act more as firm insiders and may trade on the private information instead of disseminating 
information  to the general public (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Xu and Malkiel 2003).  
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synchronicity around IFRS adoption therefore remains an empirical issue. We formally 
state hypotheses 3a and 3b as follows: 
H3a: The negative stock return synchronicity effect of institutional ownership is 
attenuated in the period of the first-time IFRS-compliant reporting, ceteris paribus. 
 
H3b: The negative stock return synchronicity effect of institutional ownership is 
attenuated in the period following the first-time IFRS-compliant reporting, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Finally, we consider whether the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on stock 
return synchronicity differs with the degree to which the accounting rules in a country 
change with the mandatory switch to IFRS.  We focus on the extent of changes in the 
accounting rules because the lumpiness of the newly released information under first-
time IFRS reporting is likely to be a function of the difference between the old (i.e., local 
GAAP) and IFRS reporting.  Firms from countries with a large difference between local 
GAAP and IFRS are likely to experience a more ‘lumpy’ information shock at the time of 
mandatory IFRS adoption and a reduced post-adoption surprise compared to firms from 
countries with only a small difference between local GAAP and IFRS.  Therefore, the 
decrease in stock return synchronicity in the year of first-time IFRS reporting and the 
subsequent increase in stock return synchronicity in the post-IFRS adoption period is 
likely to be larger for firms from countries where IFRS constitutes a substantial switch 
from local GAAP.  Hypotheses 4a and 4b can be formally stated as follows. 
H4a:  The decrease in stock return synchronicity in the period of first-time IFRS-
compliant reporting is likely to be larger for firms in countries with large local 
GAAP to IFRS difference than for firms in countries with small local GAAP-IFRS 
difference, ceteris paribus. 
 
H4b:  The increase in stock return synchronicity in the period following the first- 
time IFRS-compliant reporting is likely to be larger for firms in countries with large 
local GAAP to IFRS difference than for firms in countries with small local GAAP-




3. Sample  
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure.  We construct our sample 
from the list of all firms from 14 EU (EU15 excluding Luxembourg) member countries 
that are covered by the Worldscope database.6  For each firm-year observation, we 
require that there is sufficient data available in Worldscope to compute the financial data 
items and stock returns used in the empirical tests.  
To avoid the confounding effects of changes in firm coverage over time (such as 
the inclusion in later years of younger, less profitable, and more high-tech firms in the 
database), we restrict our sample to firms with complete data for each year during the 
2003-2007 time period.  Because the focus of this study is on the effects of mandatory 
IFRS adoption, we exclude firms that voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to 2005 or adopted 
IFRS only after 2007 (such as AIM firms on the London Stock Exchange).7  We also 
exclude firms in regulated industries with SIC codes 49 and 62 because stock prices of 
regulated firms are expected to respond similarly to changes in underlying regulations 
and economic conditions (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004).  Moreover, we exclude EU 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. because these firms differ from EU firms not cross-listed in 
the U.S. in the degree of association between accounting data and share prices (Lang et 
                                                 
6 EU15 refers to the 15 European Union member countries that were members of the EU before the 
enlargement to 25 (27) countries on May 1, 2004 (January 1, 2007).  They include (in alphabetical order): 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.  
 
7 Moreover, the results for the voluntary IFRS adopters may be confounded if mandatory adoption of  IFRS 




al. 2006).8  To ensure that the returns for each sample firm are aligned in time for 
computing our measures of stock return synchronicity, we restrict our sample to firms 
with December fiscal year-ends.  This screening process results in 9,520 firm-year 
observations (1,904 unique firms) covering 55 two-digit SIC codes.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The number of firm-year observations covered within a country range from 75 in 
Austria to 1,815 in the UK.  Industries are fairly well represented in the final sample.  
Largest number of observations (about 20.2 percent) belong to SIC code 3 
(Manufacturing).  The least number of observations (about 4.8 percent) are from SIC 
code 8 (Services other than entertainment, food and accommodation). 
4. Measurement of Variables and Model Specification 
4.1. Measurement of Stock Return Synchronicity 
In order to measure stock return synchronicity, we follow the methodology 
outlined in previous studies (e.g., Morck et al. 2000; Durnev et al., 2003; Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2004).  We consider three alternative specifications of the empirical model 
using weekly returns for each firm over a 12-month period.  First, we regress weekly 
returns on the current and prior week’s value-weighted market return as follows: 
RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w + β2MARETi,w-1  + εi,w                   (1) 
where w refers to week w, RET is firm-level return compounded weekly, and MARET 
equals the value-weighted market-wide compounded return that is computed using all 
firms in the market (except for firm i).  Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), we 
                                                 
8 Prior research (e.g., Coffee 1999; Karolyi 2006) has noted that a U.S. listing subjects a cross-listed firm to 
a more stringent enforcement regime, improves investors’ ability to take action through low cost actions 
such as class actions and derivative actions, and requires it to commit to a higher level of disclosure.   
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include a lagged market return metric because of the potential for the market information 
to be incorporated into prices with a delay.  
Second, we augment the market model by regressing the firm-level weekly return 
on the current week’s and prior week’s value-weighted market and industry-level return 
(INDRETi,w) based on two-digit SIC codes.9   
RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w+ β2MARETi,w-1 + β3INDRETi,w + β4INDRETi,w-1 + εi,w          (2) 
where INDRET equals the value-weighted industry-level return for week w using 
all firms in the industry (excluding firm i), respectively, and where industry is defined 
based on the same two-digit SIC code as firm i. 
Third, we estimate the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model to adjust for 
exposures to systematic risk arising from a market factor, a size factor, and a value factor. 
Specifically,  
                      RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w + β1SMBi w + β1HMLi,w + εi,w                                  (3) 
where the terms SMB (small minus big) and HML (high minus low) are the 
weekly returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size 
and book-to-market effects, respectively, and all other variables are as defined before.  
We obtain weekly international SMB and HML factors for EU countries from Bekaert et 
al. (2009), who compute SMB for each country as the difference between the value-
weighted returns of the smallest 30% of firms and the largest 30% of firms within a 
country.  They compute the HML factor in a similar way using high versus low book-to-
market stocks.  
                                                 
9 All results relating to the synchronicity variables based on model (1) and (2) reported in this paper define 
MARET and INDRET using country-weighted returns.  Unreported results using an EU market index and 
EU industry indices yield inferences similar to those reported in the paper.  
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We estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) for firm i in year t using weekly returns 
over the 12-month return window ending 4 months after the fiscal year-end to ensure that 
earnings-related news flows into the returns during the time-period used for computing 
our synchronicity measures.10  In doing so, we require weekly return data to be available 
for at least 45 weeks in each estimation period.  As in other studies, we define stock 











R where R2 is the coefficient of 
determination obtained from one of the three estimation models: market model, industry-
augmented market model, and Fama-French 3 factor model.  Specifically, we consider 
three different measures of SYNCH using R2 from equations (1), (2), and (3), denoted by 
SYNCH(1), SYNCH(2), and SYNCH(3), respectively.  The log transformation changes 
the R2 variable, bound by zero and one, into a continuous variable with a more normal 
distribution.  By construction, higher values of this variable reflect higher comovement of 
firm returns.  
4.2. Empirical Models 
To examine the relation between stock return synchronicity (i.e., the firm-specific 
informativeness of stock prices) and the mandatory adoption of IFRS, we estimate the 
following model: 
SYNCHi,t = α0 + β1ADOPTi  + β2POST_ADOPTi + β3Log(NREVi,t)   
 
                         +  β4ADOPTi*log(NREVi,t)  + β5POST_ADOPTi*log(NREVi,t)   
 
+  β6INSTITi,t + β7ADOPTi*INSTITi,t  + β8POST_ADOPTi*INSTITi,t  
                                                 
10 To assess whether this assumption was reasonable, we checked the annual earnings announcement dates 
of firms in our sample and found that 95 percent of our firms had an earnings announcement before April 
30.  To the extent that the release of IFRS-based financial statements could have occurred after April 30, it 
is possible that some of the IFRS-based financial information may not be reflected in our synchronicity 





+  ΦX  + γj ∑INDj + εi,t                                                                                                                (4)         
Where:  
SYNCH                =     a measure of synchronicity of firm-level stock returns.  
ADOPT      =  dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation relates to the fiscal 
year ending on December 31, 2005, and 0 otherwise. 
POST_ADOPT     =  dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation relates to the fiscal 
year ending on December 31, 2006 (or 2007) and 0 otherwise. 
Log(NREV)      =  log of average number of analyst revisions of one-year ahead 
forecasts of annual earnings during the pre-IFRS adoption period 
[Source: IBES detailed files]. 
INSTIT       =  the average proportion of institutional holdings in a firm during the 
pre-IFRS adoption period [Source: Amadeus]. 
Φ, X      =     Vector of coefficients and control variables, respectively.   
IND                       =  industry fixed effects based on one-digit SIC code. 
i, j, t                      =  firm i, industry j, and time t, respectively. 
 
We utilize a pooled time-series, cross-sectional approach to estimate model (4).   
Moreover, we use firm clustering to estimate the standard errors of coefficients to 
account for the correlation of a given firm’s residuals over time.  That is, t-statistics are 
based on White (1980) robust variance estimates that are adjusted for within-cluster 
correlation where a firm comprises the cluster (Petersen 2009).11  
The empirical model (4) includes two main effect variables, ADOPT and 
POST_ADOPT, to capture the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption relative to the pre-
period covering fiscal years ending on December 31, 2003 and December 31, 2004.12   
                                                 
11 This firm clustering approach assumes that the time effect is fixed.  In case of the presence of a time 
effect that is not fixed, the econometrics literature recommends the use of clustering on two dimensions 
simultaneously (e.g. firm and time).  However, the effectiveness of clustering on two dimensions depends 
on the ability to derive unbiased clustered standard error estimates.  For example, Petersen (2009, Figure 5, 
p. 455) shows that bias in clustered standard error estimates declines with number of clusters, dropping 
from 27% when there are five years (or clusters) to 3% when there are 40 years.  Similarly Gow et al. 
(2010) show that two-way robust standard errors based on firm and year can produce better inferences 
when there are at least as few as 10 year clusters.  Given that we have 5 years of data and that our empirical 
model (4) has interactions of analysts and institutions with year effects, there is not enough variation in our 
year-clusters.  As a result, we do not cluster standard errors by time.  
 
12 To rule out the possibility that the information in IFRS-based financial statements was anticipated prior 
to the mandatory IFRS adoption, we repeated our empirical tests by deleting the year 2004 in defining the 
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These two variables are also interacted in model (4) with the two variables representing 
informed market participants, financial analysts and institutional investors, to assess the 
role of these participants in affecting stock return synchronicity over time.  Empirical 
model (4) also includes industry dummies to control for potential industry fixed effects 
along with several firm-specific and country-level control variables, which are discussed 
in more detail in section 4.3.  Appendix 1 provides a detailed description of all variables 
of interest including the control variables. 
Hypothesis H1a is supported if β1 in model (4) is significantly negative and 
hypothesis H1b is supported if β2 in model (4) is significantly positive.  In terms of the 
test of hypotheses H2a and H2b relating to financial analysts, we expect the signs of the 
coefficients (β4 and β5) on the interaction terms, ADOPT*log(NREV) and 
POST_ADOPT*log(NREV), to be positive.  Moreover, for hypotheses H3a and H3b 
relating to institutional investors, we expect the sign of the coefficients (β7 and β8) on the 
interaction terms, ADOPT*INSTIT and POST_ADOPT*INSTIT also to be positive. 
To test hypothesis H4a and H4b, we partition our sample based on the number of 
differences between the local GAAP of a sample country to IFRS in 2000, and re-
estimate empirical model (4) for each partition.13  We then use a Chow (1960) test to 
evaluate the differences in the parameter estimates (β1 and β2) for the two subsamples.  
4.3 Control Variables 
We now turn to the main firm- and country-level control variables used in our 
empirical model (4).  These variables, which have been argued or shown in prior research 
to be related to stock return synchronicity, are as follows.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pre-IFRS period. Untabulated results using the new benchmark period indicate that our inferences remain 
unchanged when we use 2003 as the Pre-IFRS period.  
13 We describe the measurement of the local GAAP difference relative to IFRS in section 4.4.  
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Our first set of control variables are based on a direct transformation of R2, the 
variable used to compute our synchronicity measure. Specifically, R2 = β2Sxx/ (β2Sxx + 
SSE), where β is the stock’s co-movement with the market, Sxx is the market-wide return 
variation, and SSE is the idiosyncratic return variation. Thus, we include Beta(MARKET) as 
a control when SYNCH(1), which is based on the market model, is the dependent 
variable.  We include both Beta(MARKET) and Beta(INDUSTRY) as control variables when 
SYNCH(2), which is an industry-augmented market model, is used.  In case of 
SYNCH(3), which is based on Fama-French 3-factor model, we include Beta(MARKET), 
Beta(HML), and Beta(SMB).  For all three operationalizations of SYNCH, we introduce 
log(Total Volatility), which captures the market-wide volatility as an additional variable 
to control for market uncertainty elicited by mandatory IFRS adoption. 
We introduce the natural logarithm of the number of revisions, NREV, to measure 
the average number of analyst revisions and the variable INSTIT to measure the average 
number of shares held by institutions (as a fraction of the number of shares outstanding at 
the beginning of the year).  Both these variables are measured in the period prior to 
mandatory IFRS adoption.14  Based on prior literature discussed in section 2, we expect a 
positive relation between NREV and SYNCH and a negative relation between INSTIT 
and SYNCH.  
We include the market value of equity (MCAP) at fiscal year-end to control for a 
firm’s size and its associated effects on stock return synchronicity.  To the extent that 
                                                 
14 We use number of revisions and not analyst following because analyst revision activity is a better 
indicator of analyst effort compared to the number of unique analysts following a firm (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2004).  Further, we measure NREV and INSTIT using Pre-IFRS data to avoid the problem of 
reverse causality because higher analyst activity and higher institutional holdings in 2005 and later may be 




firm size is positively associated with various dimensions of a firm’s information 
environment not captured by NREV and/or INSTIT, firm size could negatively influence 
stock return synchronicity.  Alternatively, if information acquisition is less costly for 
large firms, then, in equilibrium, investors may optimally choose to learn more about 
large firms (Kelly 2007).  Thus, firm size could also influence stock return synchronicity 
positively.  Given these conflicting arguments, we do not predict the sign for the variable 
MCAP in the regressions. 
Further, growth opportunities and leverage are likely to affect stock return 
synchronicity if these characteristics expose a firm to financial distress.  We include end 
of the fiscal year market-to-book ratio (MTB) and the ratio of total debt to total assets 
(LEVERAGE) as additional control variables.  Because of their higher intrinsic risk, 
firms with more growth opportunities and higher financial leverage are likely to exhibit 
lower stock return synchronicity.  Therefore, we predict a negative relation between 
SYNCH and both MTB and LEVERAGE.  
Synchronicity has been also linked to the age of the firm (Dasgupta et al., 2010).  
Older firms tend to exhibit more synchronicity than do younger firms because investors 
are less informed about younger firms.  We therefore control for firm age measured as the 
number of years since its year of listing on the local stock exchange.  We expect a 
positive relation between AGE and SYNCH. 
Another determinant of stock return synchronicity is industry concentration 
(Piotroski and Roulstone 2004).  To the extent firms’ performances are more 
interdependent in a concentrated industry, news about an individual firm operating in a 
concentrated industry is likely to affect its industry peers more.  We therefore control for 
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the extent of industry-level concentration by using the Herfindahl index (HERF) for each 
year and for each industry based on a two-digit SIC classification.  HERF is the sum 
within each industry of the square of each firm’s market share based on its revenues 
relative to the total revenues of the industry in that firm’s country of domicile.15  Higher 
HERF values imply that market share is concentrated in the hands of a few large firms.  
Hence, SYNCH is expected to be positively related to HERF.  In regression models 
where SYNCH(2) is the dependent variable, we also include the average number of firms 
(NIND) used to compute weekly industry-level returns to control for any differences in 
SYNCH(2) arising from differences in sample size used for estimation purposes 
(Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004).  
Finally, model (4) also includes two country-level characteristics that are likely to 
affect stock return synchronicity.  The first country-level variable we control for is the 
variation in economic conditions across countries (i.e., the state of the economy) by 
including the annual real GDP growth rate (GDPG).  Data on GDPG is obtained from 
World Bank (2008).  Kearney and Poti (2008) report intertemporal variation in 
idiosyncratic volatility in EU markets, suggesting that synchronicity may (at least 
partially) reflect business cycle patterns.  We do not predict a particular direction for the 
variable GDPG in the regressions.  We also include a country-specific measure for the 
ease with which companies can raise capital (ACCESS).  This variable, obtained from 
World Bank (2006), is available only for the year 2004.  It ranges between 0 (very hard) 
                                                 
15 Results remain qualitatively unchanged, however, when we define HERF at the EU-year level.  
Separately, we recognize that the change in accounting standards worsens the problem of obtaining 
comparable data over time, potentially affecting the choice and computation of control variables based on 
financial statement data.  As a sensitivity test, we recomputed HERF using number of employees. The 




and 7 (very easy).16   Morck et al. (2000) note that better access to capital stimulates 
informed trading attributable to firm-specific price changes, resulting in less stock return 
synchronicity.  Thus, we expect a negative relation between ACCESS and our SYNCH 
measures. 
4.4 Measurement of Local GAAP Differences Relative to IFRS 
 
We use the country-level data reported in Bae et al. (2008, Table 1) to derive a 
measure of differences in local GAAP and IFRS for each country in our sample.  Bae et 
al. (2008) rely on a comprehensive survey (Nobes 2001) to identify differences in 21 key 
accounting items for each country in their analyses.17  A country is deemed to have local 
GAAP similar to IFRS for an item listed in Table 1 of Bae et al. (2008) if it conforms to 
IFRS for that item.  We then assign the country a ‘GAAP difference’ score of zero for 
that item.  In contrast, if a country is deemed to have local GAAP different than IFRS for 
an item listed in Table 1 of Bae et al. (2008), we assign the country a ’GAAP difference’ 
score of one for that item.  This procedure is repeated for all 21 accounting items on Bae 
et al.’s (2008) list and the total ‘GAAP difference’ score is the sum of the scores for that 
specific country across all 21 items.  This score is our primary measure of local 
accounting standard differences and has a theoretical range from zero to 21.  We denote 
                                                 
16 We also estimated regression models by substituting ACCESS by an index covering a variety of size 
aspects (market capitalization to GDP; value traded to GDP; and turnover ratio) of a country’s equity 
market (World Bank 2008), and by property rights index derived by Morck et al. (2000).  Results of these 
alternative estimations did not alter our inferences.  
  
17 Bae et al. (2008) use strict criteria for identifying GAAP differences and select only 21 items out of a 
longer list of 80 original key accounting issues. Examples of such items relate to the recognition and 
measurement of financial instruments (IAS 32/39); impairment losses (IAS 22/38); provisions (IAS 37); 
employee benefit liabilities (IAS 19); capitalization of research and development expenses and internally 
generated intangible assets (IAS 38); disclosure of related party transactions (IAS 24); presentation of a 
statement of changes in equity (IAS 1) and a statement of cash flows (IAS 7).  Our results remain 
qualitatively unchanged if we use the more extensive list of accounting GAAP differences as reported in 




this measure of GAAP differences as DIFF_GAAP.  By construction, higher values of 
this variable reflect greater difference in a country’s local GAAP relative to IFRS.  In our 
sample of countries, the DIFF_GAAP variable ranges between a minimum of 1 for 
Ireland and the UK to a maximum of 17 out of 21 for Greece.  For testing purposes, we 
classify a country as having a large local GAAP-IFRS difference if its DIFF_GAAP 
value is more than the sample median value of 12.18 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A of Figure 1 shows Box-Whisker plots of the synchronicity measure 
SYNCH(2), based on the industry-augmented market model, to highlight the evolution in 
synchronicity for the whole EU market over three distinct time periods.19  Similarly, 
panel B of Figure 1 shows the evolution in SYNCH(2) across two subsamples of 
countries classified by local GAAP-IFRS differences.  In these figures, period 1 refers to 
the years 2003 and 2004 when IFRS adoption was not mandatory.  Period 2 covers the 
year 2005 when mandatory IFRS adoption was effective and firms produced their first 
IFRS-compliant information, and period 3 refers to the years following first IFRS-
compliant financial statements (2006 and 2007).   
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 2] 
                                                 
18 The 8 countries classified in the large local GAAP-IFRS difference category are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, and the 6 countries classified in the small local GAAP-
IFRS difference category are Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK.   
19 We choose to report only SYNCH(2) box-whisker plots for the reason of brevity. Unreported results 
using the other two SYNCH measures, SYNCH(1) and SYNCH(3), are very similar.  However, it is 
noteworthy that SYNCH(2) measure, based on the industry-augmented market model, on average,  explains 
the highest percentage (25.7 percent) of individual stock returns. SYNCH(1), based on the market model, 
explains the least (8.2 percent), and SYNCH(3) based on Fama-French 3 factor model explains 14.6 
percent. Further, pairwise correlations between all SYNCH measures are fairly high and vary between a 




For the whole EU market, SYNCH(2) exhibits first a decreasing pattern in 2005 
(a 8% decrease from -1.79 in 2003-04 to -1.93 in 2005) and then an increasing pattern in 
the 2006-07 time period (a 36% increase from -1.79 in 2003-04 to -1.15 in 2006 and 
2007).  A similar V-shaped pattern in SYNCH(2) emerges for the subsample of firms 
from countries with large differences in local GAAP to IFRS (See Panel B of Figure 1).  
Test statistics based on Mann-Whitney test for difference in median values of SYNCH(2)  
around the mandatory IFRS adoption are always statistically significant (p<0.01) for the 
whole EU market and for the subsample of firms from countries with large differences in 
local GAAP to IFRS.  On a univariate basis, the results for the whole EU market provide 
initial evidence consistent with our hypotheses H1a and H1b, which predict synchronicity 
to first decrease in the year when mandatory IFRS adoption became effective, and then to 
increase after the mandatory IFRS adoption.    
   Moreover, panel B of Figure 1 shows that the SYNCH(2) variable for the 
subsample of firms from countries with small local GAAP-IFRS difference does not 
exhibit a decreasing pattern in the year of mandatory IFRS adoption, even though the 
median SYNCH(2) value in period 3 (the years after the first year of mandatory IFRS 
adoption) is the highest.  To examine whether a particular country is driving the 
subsample results, Table 2 reports the evolutions in SYNCH(2) over time for each 
country grouped into either the large or the small local GAAP-IFRS difference 
subsample.  Each of the eight EU countries included in the large local GAAP-IFRS 
category exhibit a V-shaped pattern in the evolution of SYNCH.  However, this V-shaped 
pattern prevails for 4 of the 6 EU countries classified into the subsample of countries with 
small local GAAP-IFRS difference. The exceptions are Denmark and Ireland.  Taken 
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together, the evidence for subsamples classified by the local GAAP-IFRS difference is 
consistent with the underlying premise of hypotheses H4a and H4b that the lumpy 
information shock is most pronounced in countries where IFRS may impact financial 
reports the most.  
     Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for selected variables used in our 
empirical tests.  Median SYNCH values are highest for SYNCH(2), suggesting that the 
industry-augmented market model (2) explains most of the variation in firm-level returns.  
Further, the mean values of each of the three SYNCH measures are slightly lower than 
the median values, indicating that the distributions of these variables are a little left-
skewed.  The mean number of analyst earnings forecast revisions is 11.74; for 25 percent 
of the firms analysts do more than 12 revisions per year.  The mean percentage of 
institutional holdings in a firm is 6.53 percent.  Mean firm size (as measured by the 
market value of equity or MCAP) is 1.254 billion Euros.20  Sample firms have a mean 
(median) market-to-book ratio of 2.49 (1.73).  Financial leverage measured as long term 
debt to total assets (LEVERAGE) is below 72 percent for 95 percent of the observations.  
The median firm is listed for 14 years when it enters our analysis.  There is considerable 
cross-sectional variation in the HERF value and in the mean number of firms used in 
calculating the weekly industry returns.  The mean real annual GDP growth rate over the 
period of our study (2003-2007) is 2.49 percent.  The average ACCESS index value is 
4.98 (on a scale of 0 for very hard to 7 for very easy), and only is below 4 for about 5 
                                                 
20 This mean value is smaller than that reported by Li (2010) for her sample, which is not surprising 
because the requirement to compute ex ante cost of capital biased her sample towards larger firms with 




percent of observations; all of which indicates that our sample of EU countries exhibit 
easier access to capital than average.  
[Insert Table 3] 
5.2 Correlations 
Table 4 presents the Pearson/Spearman pairwise correlations among variables 
used in model (4).21  The correlation between SYNCH(2) and ADOPT is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that that there is less stock return 
synchronicity (i.e., there is more firm-specific information in stock prices) during the first 
year when IFRS were mandated.  In contrast, SYNCH(2) and POST_ADOPT are 
positively correlated, suggesting that there is more stock return synchronicity (i.e., there 
is less firm-specific information in stock prices) during the two years following the first 
IFRS reports.  These correlations are consistent with the evolutions in the synchronicity 
measure documented in Figure 1.  Moreover, SYNCH(2) has statistically significant and 
positive correlations exceeding 0.20 with Beta(MARKET), Beta(INDUSTRY), log(Total 
Volatility), log(NREV), MCAP, and GDPG.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The highest (absolute) pairwise Pearson/Spearman correlation among the control 
variables is 0.61/0.64 (between variables NREV and MCAP), indicating that especially 
larger firms experience more analyst revision activity.  Moreover, the correlations of 
MCAP with both AGE and INSTIT are positive, suggesting that larger firms are older 
and have more institutional holdings.  To examine whether these correlations are 
problematic in regression estimations, we diagnose multicollinearity in the regressions 
                                                 
21 For the reason of brevity, we only report correlations of variables with SYNCH(2).  We note that 
untabulated correlations of variables in model (4) with SYNCH(1) and SYNCH(3) yield similar patterns.  
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using variance inflation factors (VIFs).  Overall, these VIFs are low, suggesting that 
collinearity is unlikely to be a significant issue in interpreting the regression results.   
5.3 Regression Results: Effect on Synchronicity 
Table 5 reports regression results using stock return synchronicity as the 
dependent variable.  The dependent variable in columns labeled [1] – [3] is SYNCH(1), 
which is based on the market model.  The dependent variable in columns [4] and [5] are 
SYNCH(2) and SYNCH(3) based on industry-augmented market model and Fama-
French 3-factor model, respectively.  The first two columns use alternative specifications 
of model (4).  In particular, the specification in column [1] ignores the role of analysts 
and institutions and focuses on the main effects of our test variables ADOPT and 
POST_ADOPT.  The specification in column [2] introduces the main effects of analysts 
and institutions activities as additional control variables. The remaining columns report 
results for model (4) that considers both the role of financial analysts and institutions 
around the mandatory IFRS adoption.  We do not report the industry fixed effects for 
brevity. As reported in Table 4, the explanatory power of the models ranges between 
0.365 and 0.522.   
[Insert Table 5] 
  In Table 5, the coefficient on ADOPT is negative and statistically significant 
(p<0.01) in all columns, indicating that stock return synchronicity declined with the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS.  In terms of economic magnitude, the mandatory switch to 
IFRS reduced stock return synchronicity by approximately 5.7 percent (the coefficient of 
-0.116 on the ADOPT variable divided by the coefficient of -2.03 on the intercept 
reported in the first column).  Since the firm-specific informativeness of stock prices 
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varies inversely with stock return synchronicity, our findings suggest that the firm-
specific information in stock prices increased in the first year of the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS.  In contrast, the coefficient on POST_ADOPT is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01), indicating that stock return synchronicity increased in the years after 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  This positive coefficient represents an increase in stock 
return synchronicity in the post-IFRS adoption years of about 9.3 percent (compared to 
the pre IFRS period; computed by dividing the coefficient of 0.19 on the POST_ADOPT 
variable by the coefficient of -2.03 on the intercept in the first column).  Collectively, 
these results are consistent with the argument that the lumpy information component 
originating from mandatory IFRS adoption resulted in stock prices behaving more 
idiosyncratically when the new information was revealed to the market for the first time 
and subsequently lowered the surprise component in future earnings shocks in the 
POST_ADOPT period. 
We corroborate the main effects of analyst activity and institutional holdings on 
SYNCH for our EU sample in column [2] and test for hypotheses H2a-H3b in columns 
labeled [3], [4] and [5].  The coefficients on variable log(NREV) are positive and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that analyst activities exert a positive impact 
on stock return synchronicity.  This result is consistent with Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) who find that analysts in the U.S. increase the amount of industry-level 
information in prices.  The interaction of ADOPT with log(NREV) is not statistically 
significant (p>0.10), even though the unreported F-statistic indicates that the sum of the 
coefficients of Log(NREV) and its interaction with ADOPT is positive and statistically 
significant (p<0.01).  The absence of an incremental effect for financial analysts in the 
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year of mandatory IFRS adoption is not supportive of our hypothesis H2a.  However, the 
interaction between POST_ADOPT and log(NREV) is statistically significant (p<0.01) 
with a positive sign, which is consistent with our hypothesis H2b.  These results suggest 
that analysts contributed to more stock return synchronicity only after the first year of 
mandatory IFRS adoptions.  Overall, this result is similar to the evidence in Kim and Shi 
(2010), who report that the synchronicity-reducing effect of voluntary IFRS adoption is 
attenuated for firms with high analyst following.  
As predicted, the coefficients on the variable, INSTIT, are negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), which suggests that more institutional ownership lowers 
stock return synchronicity.  This result is also consistent with Xu and Malkiel (2003) and 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) finding that institutions possess an information advantage 
and that they are able to increase the relative flow of firm-specific information through 
their activities.  However, the interaction of INSTIT with both ADOPT and 
POST_ADOPT are not statistically significant (p>0.10), indicating that the negative 
relation between synchronicity and institutional ownership which existed in the pre-IFRS 
period is not affected in later periods.  These results suggest that the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS did not alter private information collection by institutional investors.  This 
evidence fails to support our predictions under hypothesis H3a and H3b.  
Table 5 also shows that there are several other significant determinants of 
synchronicity for EU firms.  The coefficients on risk proxies, Beta(MARKET), and log(Total 
Volatility) are significantly positive across all columns.  This suggests that higher 
systematic risk and higher market volatility lowers the incorporation of firm-specific 
information into stock prices, and thus increases stock price synchronicity.  Other risk 
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factors such as Beta(INDUSTRY), Beta(HML), Beta(SMB), are also significantly related to our 
synchronicity measures.  Consistent with the U.S. finding of Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004), the coefficients on MCAP are significantly positive across all columns.  This 
indicates that in EU countries, stock prices of large firms tend to move together with the 
market to a greater extent than do stock prices of small firms.  Moreover, the coefficients 
on MTB are significantly negative across all columns, suggesting that firms with high 
growth opportunities tend to have more firm-specific information incorporated into their 
share prices, and thus exhibit a lower level of stock price synchronicity. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the coefficients for LEVERAGE, Log(AGE) and HERF are insignificant 
across all columns.  Finally, stock return synchronicity increases with higher GDP growth 
rates and it decreases with the variable ACCESS measuring the ease with which firms 
domiciled in a country can raise capital.   
5.4 Regression Results: Stock Return Synchronicity and Earnings Informativeness  
While important, our evidence on lower stock return synchronicity around IFRS 
adoption could alternatively be interpreted as reflecting more noise in firm-level stock 
returns as opposed to higher stock price informativeness.  In other words, the portion of 
stock returns unexplained by market-wide, industry-level and risk-adjusted returns could 
still be merely measuring statistical noise.  To disentangle the noise versus information 
component story in our main findings, we perform an additional test to examine if our 
measure of stock return synchronicity captures the amount of firm-specific information 
(relative to market-wide and/or industry-wide information) impounded into observed 
stock prices in the EU market by focusing on a short-window around earnings 
announcements, which are viewed as important events for value-relevant firm-specific 
31 
 
information.  If SYNCH correctly captures the extent of firm-specific information 
capitalization into stock prices, we expect the trading volume and return volatility 
response to annual earnings announcements to be weaker for firms with high SYNCH 
than for firms with low SYNCH. 
To provide empirical evidence on this issue, we first estimate abnormal trading 
volume and abnormal return volatility around earnings announcements for a subsample 
of firms with annual earnings announcement dates available on Worldscope database and 
then regress these metrics on our synchronicity measures and other factors likely to be 
associated with abnormal volume and volatility.  Additional data restrictions yield a 
constant sample of 8,250 (1,650 unique firms) and 7,940 (1,588 unique firms) firm-year 
observations for the abnormal volume and volatility regressions, respectively. 
Following Landsman and Maydew (2002), we compute cumulative abnormal 
volume (CAVOLi) for each firm i around the annual earnings announcement date as the 
sum of abnormal volume (AVOLid) defined as (Vid - iV )/σi, where Vid is equal to the 
number of shares of firm i traded during day d (d = -1, 0, +1) relative to earnings 
announcement day (d=0), divided by shares outstanding of firm i during day d; and iV  
and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of daily trading volume for firm 
i in the period  d-345 to d-20 and d+20 to d+345.22  Analogously, the cumulative 
abnormal volatility measure (CAVARi) for each firm around the annual earnings 
                                                 
22 In estimating the values of iV  and σi,,  we  exclude the 20 days before and after each of the other earnings 
announcements contained within this estimation window. There is some variation with regard to reporting 
frequency both across and within countries: some firms report on an annual, semi-annual, or quarterly 
basis. To control for these differences, we exclude each quarterly, semi-annual or annual earnings 
announcement in the estimation period surrounding each annual earnings announcement, and require at 




announcement date is the sum of abnormal volatility (AVARid) defined as uid/σi2, where 
uid is daily market model-adjusted return computed as Rid – (αi + βiRmd), Rid is the raw 
return of firm i on day d, Rmd is equally-weighted return of market for day d,  αi and βi are 
firm i’s market model parameter estimates, and σi2 is the variance of firm i’s market 
model adjusted returns, each of which is calculated during the period d-345 to d-20 and 
d+20 to d+345.  Unlike the AVOLid measure, AVARid is always positive, where values 
between zero and one are indicative of smaller than normal volatility and values greater 
than one reflect higher abnormal volatility (Landsman and Maydew 2002).  
To test the relation between earnings informativeness and synchronicity, we 
employ the following model: 23 
 CAVOLi (or CAVARi)   =     λ0 +  λ1SYNCHi(2) +  λ2 MCAPi   + λ3  MTBi  
 
            + λ4D_NEGEPSi + λ5LEVERAGEi +λ4Beta(MARKET) 
 
            + λ7Beta(INDUSTRY) + λ8LOG(NREV)i +λ9INSTITi  
 
        + λj ∑INDj+  λc ∑CTRYc   + εi                                  (5) 
 
where D_NEGEPS is equal to one for a firm reporting a loss, and 0 otherwise; 
CTRY refers to country fixed effects, and all other variables are as defined before.  In all 
estimations, we compute t-statistics based on White (1980) robust variance estimates that 
are adjusted for within-cluster correlation where a firm comprises the cluster (Petersen 
2009).  To alleviate a concern over the possibility that the regression results for model (5) 
are unduly influenced by a small number of outlier values of SYNCH(2) and/or 
SYNCH(2) values are measured with error, we also use DR_SYNCH(2) instead of 
SYNCH(2) in alternative regression specifications.  To obtain DR_SYNCH(2), we 
                                                 
23 For brevity, we tabulate results using SYNCH(2) as the measure of synchronicity. Unreported results 
using SYNCH(1) or SYNCH(3) yielded similar inferences.  
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classify our firms into deciles based upon the ranked values of SYNCH(2) in each sample 
year, with zero representing the smallest decile of SYNCH(2) and nine representing the 
largest. We then scale the decile ranks to range between zero and one (Landsman and 
Maydew 2002).  
Table 6 presents the regression results using cumulative abnormal trading volume 
(CAVOL) in columns [1] and [2] and cumulative abnormal return volatility (CAVAR) in 
columns [3] and [4] as the dependent variables.  The coefficients on our synchronicity 
measures, SYNCH(2) and DR_SYNCH(2), are negative and statistically significant (p< 
0.05) in all four columns, after controlling for firm size, market-to-book, presence of a 
loss, financial leverage, systematic risk factors, number of analyst revisions, and fraction 
of shares held by institutions.  These negative relations confirm that high values of 
SYNCH(2) for our sample firms have low earnings informativeness in terms of both 
abnormal trading volume and abnormal return volatility around annual earnings 
announcements.  The above findings corroborate the view that our measure of stock price 
synchronicity is able to capture the extent of firm-specific information capitalization into 
stock prices in the EU market.      
[Insert Table 6] 
 
5.5 Subsample Regression Results Based on local GAAP-IFRS Differences 
 
Next, we re-estimate empirical model (4) for subsets of data to determine whether 
the shifts in synchronicity were similar for firms coming from countries with large versus 
small differences in local GAAP relative to IFRS. The regression results using 
SYNCH(2) as the dependent variable are presented for the two subsamples in Table 7.24 
                                                 
24 Unreported results using SYNCH (1) and SYNCH(3) as the dependent variable for the two partitions 
yielded inferences similar to those reported in Table 7.   
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[Insert Table 7] 
 
The coefficient on the variable ADOPT is statistically significant with a negative 
sign for the large DIFF_GAAP subsample only, indicating that the synchronicity drop is 
especially caused by the lumpy information shocks in countries where local GAAP 
differed substantially from IFRS.  Furthermore, the F-statistic for testing the equality of 
the coefficients on ADOPT for the two subsamples is statistically significant (p<0.01), 
which is consistent with hypothesis H4a. These results suggest that the drop in 
synchronicity after the mandatory IFRS adoption is higher for firms in countries with 
large local GAAP-IFRS difference than that for firms in countries with small local 
GAAP-IFRS difference.  
Furthermore, the variable POST_ADOPT is significant with a positive sign for 
both subsamples, although the coefficient is of a lower statistical significance (p<0.10) 
for firms in countries with small differences in local GAAP to IFRS.  The F-statistic for 
testing the equality of the coefficients on POST_ADOPT for the two subsamples is 
statistically significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the increase in synchronicity in the 
POST_ADOPT period is especially observed in countries with large differences in local 
GAAP rather than for firms in countries with small differences in local GAAP.  
Taken together, these results suggest that the lumpy IFRS information shock and 
the subsequent increase in synchronicity were merely caused by firms from countries 
where large differences existed in local GAAP versus IFRS. This evidence provides 
supports for both H4a and H4b.   
5.6 Subsample Regression Results Classified by the Magnitude of IFRS 




To further substantiate that the observed synchronicity decline in the year of 
mandatory IFRS adoption reported in Table 5 is indeed attributable to the switch to IFRS, 
we examine how cross-sectional variation in firm-specific local GAAP to IFRS earnings 
reconciliations affect the IFRS adoption-synchronicity relation in the year of mandatory 
IFRS adoption.  All EU firms were required to disclose reconciliations between net 
income under local GAAP and net income under IFRS for their 2004 accounts in the first 
mandatory IFRS annual reports.25  We first derive an ex post measure of the impact of the 
IFRS adoption by calculating the IFRS to local GAAP difference as the absolute value of 
2004 local GAAP earnings per share (EPS) minus the reconciled 2004 IFRS EPS, scaled 
by local EPS (i.e., |(EPSLOCAL04 - EPSIFRS04)/ EPSLOCAL04|.26  Based on this ex post 
measure, we sort our sample firms into 3 equal-sized portfolios.  The mean values of the 
restatement difference for the three portfolios are 0.028, 0.179, and 2.260, respectively. 
Given that a large relative restatement difference reflects a large lumpy information effect 
in a firm’s first IFRS reporting, we expect the synchronicity effect in the year of 
mandatory IFRS adoption to be more pronounced for a firm that experiences a larger 
restatement effect.  
To test this conjecture, we modify model (4) by focusing only on the Pre-IFRS 
period and the year of mandatory IFRS adoption for the three portfolios and report the 
separate regression results using SYNCH(2) as the dependent variable for each of the 
                                                 
25 Although EU firms were also required to disclose a reconciliation of book value of equity and cash 
flows, we focus on the reconciliation of earnings because such reconciliations are most often included in 
firms’ first-time disclosure of quantitative information regarding the impact of IFRS.  Christensen et al. 
(2009) show significant stock market reactions for a sample of UK firms that release earnings 
reconciliations early.  In the same vein, Horton and Serafeim (2008) find significant negative abnormal 
returns and positive trading activity for firms reporting a negative reconciliation adjustment on UK GAAP 
earnings. 
 
26 We were able to compute this ex post measure for 1,517 firms.  Results (available upon request) are 
robust to various alternative scalars such as total assets, sales and beginning-of-the-year market value.  
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three groups in Table 8.  Note that there are 505 firms in the portfolios labeled as small 
and large, and that there are 507 firms (1,521 firm-year observations) in the medium 
portfolio.  The ADOPT variable is negative and statistically significant (p <0.10) only for 
the sub-sample of firms with the largest differences in local GAAP versus IFRS restated 
EPS.  Unreported F-statistics indicate that the absolute value of the magnitude of the 
coefficients on ADOPT are the largest for the firms in the LARGE restatement group.  
Again, this evidence is consistent with the conjecture that stock price informativeness 
undergoes the largest effects when the lumpy information associated with mandatory 
IFRS adoption is highest.  Overall, these results show that stock return synchronicity 
effects of mandatory IFRS adoptions in the year of adoption vary cross-sectionally and 
are related to a specific proxy capturing the size of the lumpy information component, 
namely the difference in the 2004 local GAAP to IFRS earnings reconciliations.  
[Insert Table 8] 
6. Conclusions   
The recent move towards the introduction of a single set of accounting standards 
such as IFRS is a regulatory reporting change without historical precedent.  In this paper, 
we examine the extent to which mandatory IFRS adoption affects the information flow 
and contributes to stock price informativeness in the year 2005 when IFRS became 
mandatory in EU and in the post-IFRS adoption years (2006-2007) relative to pre-IFRS 
years (2003-2004).  
Using a carefully constructed sample of 1,904 EU firms over the period from 
2003 to 2007, we find that the stock return synchronicity decreased in the year of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, but subsequently increased in the post-adoption years to levels 
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higher than the pre-adoption period.  This result is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that mandatory adoption of IFRS at first is likely to increase the private 
information flow entering into the stock price formation process and to reduce 
subsequently the surprise effects of future information releases.  Moreover, we find that 
analysts’ activity led to more stock return synchronicity after the mandatory switch to 
IFRS, which is consistent with the notion that IFRS helped financial analysts in 
interpreting and disseminating common information across all firms in the industry.  
However, we find no evidence that higher levels of institutional holdings affected stock 
return synchronicity differently in the year of mandatory IFRS adoption or in the post-
IFRS adoption years, suggesting that the mandatory adoption of IFRS did not alter the 
private information advantage enjoyed by institutional investors.  We also find that the V-
shaped synchronicity effect is most pronounced for firms domiciled in countries where 
local GAAP differs more from IFRS, which is consistent with mandatory IFRS adoptions 
contributing the largest effects where information flows are potentially most affected.  
Taken together, these results yield novel insights into how a mandated financial reporting 
harmonization process shapes capital market information flows including the distinctive 
roles played by a firm’s information environment on this particular process.  Overall, our 
paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the economic benefits and costs of a 
mandatory accounting change.   
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Figure 1:  Median Synchronicity Evolution 
 
This Figure reports Box-Whisker plots of country-median value of SYNCH(2) across three periods and 
tests of statistical differences between country-median synchronicity measure (z-value; Mann-Whitney test) 
over the three periods. Panel A contains values for all countries (pooled) and Panel B is for countries with 
above (left-hand side) and below (right-hand side) sample median country-level differences between local 
GAAP and IFRS. DIFF_GAAP is LARGE (SMALL) if local GAAP differs substantially from IFRS on 
more than (less than) 12 [i.e., the sample median] of 21 key accounting items as in Bae et al. (2008). Period 
1 refers to 2003 and 2004 when IFRS adoption was not mandatory. Period 2 refers to 2005 when IFRS 
adoption became mandatory. Period 3 covers years after the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption (2006 
and 2007).   Significance levels are reported in brackets. The Variable SYNCH(2) is defined in Appendix 
1. 
 




 Period 1 vs. 
Period 2 
Period 2 vs. 
Period 3 
Period 1 vs. 
Period 3 
z-value 3.94 (<0.01) 23.58 (<0.01) 22.92 (<0.01) 
    







Median  –1.79  –1.93  –1.15 
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Panel B: Country Classified by Differences in Local GAAP to IFRS 
 
  
 Countries with DIFF_GAAP = LARGE DIFF   Countries with DIFF_GAAP = SMALL 
 




 Period 1 vs. 
Period 2 
Period 2 vs. 
Period 3 
Period 1 vs. 
Period 3 
  Period 1 vs. 
Period 2 
Period 2 vs. 
Period 3 
 Period 1 vs. 
Period 3 
z-value 4.59 (<0.01) 18.12 (<0.01) 16.71 (<0.01)   1.08 (0.27) 14.47 (<0.01)  16.79 (<0.01) 
















Median  –1.91  –1.98  –1.29 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
 




    
EU15 Country firms, with financial statement items 




        (1) Minus firms with less than 5 years of 





















(5) Minus non-December 31 FYE firms -835 -167
 







Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of SYNCH(2) by Country-Period  
DIFF_GAAP = LARGE               DIFF_GAAP = SMALL 





























































































































































































































       
DIFF_GAAP is LARGE (SMALL) if local GAAP differs substantially from IFRS on more than (less than) 12 [i.e., the sample median] of 21 key accounting 
items as in Bae et al. (2008).  Period 1 refers to 2003 and 2004 when IFRS adoption was not mandatory.  Period 2 refers to 2005 when IFRS adoption became 
mandatory.  Period 3 covers years after the first year of mandatory IFRS adoption (2006 and 2007).   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std P5 P25 Median P75 P95
SYNCH(1) 9,520 -2.845 2.136 -7.281 -3.943 -2.407 -1.311 0.137
SYNCH(2) 9,520 -1.587 1.211 -3.457 -2.325 -1.576 -0.797 0.302
SYNCH(3) 9,520 -2.156 1.156 -4.163 -2.854 -2.082 -1.324 0.417
         
Beta(MARKET) 9,520 0.467 0.630 -0.489 0.072 0.436 0.840 1.509
Beta(INDUSTRY) 9,520 0.222 0.476 -0.470 -0.043 0.174 0.465 1.042
Total Volatility 9,520 0.019 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.028
NREV 9,520 11.74 24.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 12.00 60.00
INSTIT(%) 9,520 6.53 14.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.99 35.59
MCAP 9,520 1254 4793 7 30 112 525 5455
MTB 9,520 2.49 2.72 0.46 1.07 1.73 2.85 6.93
LEVERAGE(%) 9,520 21.81 72.06 0.00 1.19 18.14 39.85 72.76
AGE (in years) 9,520 17.09 9.01 8.00 10.00 14.00 21.00 36.00
HERF 9,520 0.364 0.235 0.067 0.184 0.311 0.496 0.872
NIND 9,520 18.80 21.01 2.00 5.00 11.00 23.00 78.00
GDPG(%) 9,520 2.492 1.268 0.088 1.711 2.600 3.263 4.725
ACCESS 9,520 4.986 0.801 3.740 4.510 4.760 5.560 6.340
 
Note: All variables are defined in Appendix 1   
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Table 4: Correlations 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] 
[1] SYNCH(2) 1.000 -0.138 0.290 0.300 0.306 0.250 0.298 0.057 0.444 -0.008 0.066 0.102 -0.047 -0.047 0.211 -0.173 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[2] ADOPT -0.151 1.000 -0.360 -0.033 -0.022 -0.457 0.054 -0.056 -0.008 0.019 0.005 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.171 0.000 
 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.07 0.62 1.00 0.56 0.26 0.00 1.00 
[3] POST_ADOPT 0.317 -0.360 1.000 0.108 0.024 0.596 0.025 0.194 0.190 0.020 0.038 0.014 -0.006 -0.061 0.267 -0.021 
 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.04 
[4] Beta(MARKET) 0.366 -0.031 0.125 1.000 -0.494 0.060 0.128 0.046 0.124 0.067 0.033 -0.014 -0.002 -0.108 0.054 -0.071 
 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[5] Beta(INDUSTRY) 0.339 -0.016 0.032 -0.427 1.000 0.027 0.098 0.005 0.128 -0.003 0.007 0.026 -0.041 0.121 0.100 -0.096 
 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.77 0.47 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[6] Total Volatility 0.276 -0.456 0.589 0.064 0.032 1.000 -0.050 0.081 0.007 -0.028 0.009 -0.110 -0.210 -0.118 0.334 -0.171 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.49 0.01 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[7] NREV 0.350 0.013 0.087 0.187 0.112 -0.066 1.000 0.123 0.606 0.069 0.067 0.159 0.152 -0.054 -0.051 0.111 
 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
[8] INSTIT(%) 0.103 -0.061 0.254 0.087 -0.002 0.083 0.343 1.000 0.125 0.070 0.004 0.119 0.100 0.012 0.086 0.002 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.82 
[9] MCAP 0.458 -0.008 0.191 0.133 0.132 -0.003 0.641 0.197 1.000 0.030 0.146 0.303 0.145 -0.167 -0.014 0.017 
 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.10 
[10] MTB 0.067 0.040 0.065 0.135 -0.027 -0.028 0.289 0.168 0.182 1.000 0.038 -0.064 0.017 0.076 0.035 0.027 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 
[11] LEVERAGE 0.142 0.001 0.091 0.047 0.042 0.017 0.222 0.025 0.322 0.021 1.000 0.018 0.008 -0.073 -0.011 0.009 
 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04  0.08 0.41 0.00 0.28 0.39 
[12] AGE 0.073 0.000 0.020 -0.038 0.008 -0.073 0.079 0.098 0.284 -0.081 0.136 1.000 0.128 -0.100 -0.035 0.012 
 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 
[13] HERF -0.041 -0.005 0.003 0.010 -0.040 -0.204 0.145 0.140 0.127 0.025 0.031 0.060 1.000 0.162 -0.287 0.346 
 0.00 0.61 0.77 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
[14] NIND -0.050 -0.007 -0.065 -0.109 0.123 -0.116 -0.077 -0.086 -0.132 0.001 -0.159 -0.111 0.197 1.000 -0.128 0.240 
 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
[15] GDPG 0.230 -0.166 0.273 0.068 0.102 0.314 -0.030 0.073 -0.005 0.055 -0.056 -0.014 -0.256 -0.131 1.000 -0.407 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00  0.00 
[16] ACCESS -0.196 0.000 -0.029 -0.082 -0.103 -0.144 0.099 0.090 0.001 0.057 0.011 0.040 0.346 0.210 -0.390 1.000 
 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Note: All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Pearson and Spearman correlations are above and below the diagonal, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are 
reported below the correlation coefficients.
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Table 5: The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Stock Return Synchronicity   
Dependent Variable:     SYNCH(1)     SYNCH(2)  SYNCH(3)  





 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  
 
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Constant -2.030 -9.21 ‡ -1.952 -6.44 ‡ -1.964 -6.31 ‡ -2.123 -10.10 ‡ -1.846 -6.81 ‡ 
ADOPT -0.116 -5.18 ‡ -0.108 -4.80 ‡ -0.084 -2.81 † -0.065 -2.29 † -0.096 -3.19 ‡ 
POST_ADOPT 0.190 6.74 ‡ 0.230 7.93 ‡ 0.132 3.76 ‡ 0.144 4.75 ‡ 0.181 5.16 ‡ 
Beta(MARKET) 0.437 20.56 ‡ 0.425 20.08 ‡ 0.426 20.16 ‡ 0.924 27.92 ‡ 0.417 19.74 ‡ 
Beta(INDUSTRY)          1.209 23.56 ‡    
Beta(HML)             0.138 8.02 ‡ 
Beta(SMB)             -0.098 -4.68 ‡ 
log(Total Volatility) 0.490 10.79 ‡ 0.487 10.70 ‡ 0.477 10.46 ‡ 0.501 12.82 ‡ 0.437 9.70 ‡ 
                
log(NREV)    0.087 5.30 ‡ 0.070 4.13 ‡ 0.027 1.75 * 0.068 4.06 ‡ 
ADOPT x log(NREV)       -0.008 -0.59  -0.011 -0.92  -0.006 -0.41  
POST_ADOPT x log(NREV)       0.081 5.62 ‡ 0.045 3.88 ‡ 0.078 5.43 ‡ 
INSTIT    -0.329 -3.70 ‡ -0.344 -3.83 ‡ -0.272 -3.67 ‡ -0.316 -3.54 ‡ 
ADOPT x INSTIT       -0.272 -1.28  0.063 0.39  -0.273 -1.37  
POST_ADOPT x INSTIT       -0.206 -1.35  0.011 0.09  -0.226 -1.48  
                
MCAP 0.245 17.04 ‡ 0.202 16.98 ‡ 0.198 16.38 ‡ 0.163 15.04 ‡ 0.192 16.12 ‡ 
MTB -0.017 -3.50 ‡ -0.016 -3.47 ‡ -0.018 -3.71 ‡ -0.018 -4.43 ‡ -0.016 -3.34 ‡ 
LEVERAGE 0.004 0.44  0.005 0.45  0.006 0.59  0.002 0.20  0.002 0.19  
LOG(AGE) -0.026 -0.67  -0.006 -0.17  0.001 0.03  0.036 1.14  0.000 0.01  
HERF  -0.006 -1.05  -0.005 -0.79  -0.005 -0.88  -0.004 -0.77  -0.005 -0.80  
Log(NIND)          0.029 1.82 *    
                
GDPG 0.099 8.87 ‡ 0.099 8.99 ‡ 0.098 8.91 ‡ 0.066 7.29 ‡ 0.090 8.28 ‡ 
ACCESS -0.149 -7.71 ‡ -0.164 -8.59 ‡ -0.167 -8.77 ‡ -0.083 -4.95 ‡ -0.170 -8.99 ‡ 
                
N  9,520   9,520   9,520   9,520   9,520   
Adjusted-R2 0.358   0.365   0.367   0.522   0.374   
Note: Regressions contain industry-fixed effects (1 digit) and standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Significance levels ‡ (1%), † (5%) 
and * (10%). 
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Table 6: Regression Results of Earnings Informativeness and Stock Return Synchronicity     
Dependent Variable: CAVOL CAVAR 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  
 
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Constant -0.725 -0.78  0.530 0.71  0.527 0.31  1.646 1.06  
SYNCH(2) -0.334 -3.61 ‡    -0.337 -2.32 †    
DR_SYNCH(2)    -1.461 -3.23 ‡    -2.094 -4.53 ‡ 
MCAP 0.047 0.86  0.050 0.86  0.231 2.46 † 0.265 2.90 ‡ 
MTB 0.003 0.13  0.002 0.10  -0.022 -0.66  -0.027 -0.81  
D_NEGEPS -0.210 -0.89  -0.225 -0.97  -0.357 -1.66 * -0.397 -1.86 * 
LEVERAGE 0.030 0.58  0.030 0.58  0.047 0.29  0.046 0.28  
Beta(MARKET) 0.591 5.21 ‡ 0.638 5.21 ‡ 0.310 1.49  0.501 2.47 † 
Beta(INDUSTRY) 0.701 4.30 ‡ 0.746 4.41 ‡ 0.424 1.56  0.653 2.52 † 
Log(NREV) 0.354 6.55 ‡ 0.359 6.62 ‡ 0.494 4.94 ‡ 0.502 5.02 ‡ 
INSTIT 0.335 0.54  0.345 0.56  0.155 0.24  0.092 0.14  
             
Industry fixed effects YES   YES   YES   YES   
Country fixed effects YES   YES   YES   YES   
Firm-clustered s.e. YES   YES   YES   YES   
         
N 8,250   8,250   7,940   7,940   
Adjusted-R2 0.032   0.032   0.055   0.056   
CAVOL is the cumulative abnormal volume for each firm i around the annual earnings announcement date and is measured as the sum of abnormal volume 
defined as (Vid - iV )/σi, where Vid is equal to the number of shares of firm i traded during day d (d = -1, 0, +1) relative to earnings announcement day (d=0), 
divided by shares outstanding of firm i during day d; and iV  and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of daily trading volume for firm i in the 
period  d-345 to d-20 and d+20 to d+345.  CAVAR is the cumulative abnormal volatility measure  for each firm around the annual earnings announcement date 
and is measured as the sum of abnormal volatility defined as uid/σi2, where uid is daily market model-adjusted return computed as Rid – (αi + βiRmd), Rid is the raw 
return of firm i on day d, Rmd is equally-weighted return of market for day d,  αi and βi are firm i’s market model parameter estimates, and σi2 is the variance of 
firm i’s market model adjusted returns, each of which is calculated during the period d-345 to d-20 and d+20 to d+345. DR_SYNCH(2) is the scaled decile rank 
based upon the ranked values of SYNCH(2) and it ranges between zero and one, where higher values represent more synchronicity. D_NEGEPS is equal to one 
for a firm reporting a loss, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Regressions contain industry-fixed effects (1 digit) and standard errors 
are clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009). Significance levels ‡ (1%), † (5%) and * (10%). 
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Table 7: Regression Results of Stock Return Synchronicity and Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption for Subsamples Classified by Local GAAP-IFRS Difference  
 
Dependent Variable: SYNCH(2)  
 
  
DIFF_GAAP = Large 
[1] 
  









Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  F-stat p-value 
Constant -1.556 -6.44 ‡ -2.539 -6.29 ‡   
ADOPT  -0.112 -2.84 ‡ -0.039 -0.94  5.15 <0.01 
POST_ADOPT 0.153 4.45 ‡ 0.100 1.81 * 11.40 <0.01 
Beta(MARKET) 1.029 25.41 ‡ 0.820 16.76 ‡   
Beta(INDUSTRY) 1.256 18.99 ‡ 1.126 14.92 ‡   
log(Total Volatility) 0.523 11.34 ‡ 0.460 6.72 ‡   
log(NREV) 0.047 3.07 ‡ 0.005 0.18  2.09 0.12 
ADOPT x log(NREV) -0.005 -0.28  -0.018 -0.99  1.68 0.19 
POST_ADOPT x log(NREV) 0.032 2.93 ‡ 0.048 2.52 ‡ 7.74 <0.01 
INSTIT -0.276 -2.40 † -0.119 -1.11  2.80 0.06 
ADOPT x INSTIT -0.410 -1.48  0.299 1.49  2.57 0.08 
POST_ADOPT x INSTIT 0.090 0.51  0.047 0.24  0.23 0.79 
MCAP 0.146 11.73 ‡ 0.181 9.95 ‡   
MTB -0.019 -3.44 ‡ -0.013 -2.31 †   
LEVERAGE 0.010 0.33  -0.001 -0.12    
Log(AGE) -0.036 -1.00  0.100 2.14 †   
HERF 0.001 0.10  -0.005 -0.66    
log(NIND) 0.049 2.93 ‡ 0.019 0.78    
GDPG 0.046 3.70 ‡ 0.076 4.72 ‡   
ACCESS -0.090 -4.53 ‡ -0.118 -1.92 ‡   
         
Industry fixed effects YES   YES     
         
Firm-clustered s.e. YES   YES     
         
N 4,820   4,700     
Adjusted-R2 0.574   0.482     
 
Regressions contain industry-fixed effects (1 digit) and standard errors are clustered at the firm-level 
(Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Significance levels ‡ (1%), † (5%) and * (10%).   
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 Table 8: Regression Results of Stock Return Synchronicity and Mandatory IFRS 
Adoption for Subsamples Classified by the EPS Restatement Difference Reported 
At  First-time IFRS Adoption 
 







 [3]  
 
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Parameter 
Estimate t-stat  
Constant -1.857 -4.35 ‡ -1.973 -5.79 ‡ -1.125 -3.01 ‡ 
ADOPT 0.040 0.68  -0.076 -1.35  -0.108 -2.04 † 
Beta(MARKET) 0.673 18.11 ‡ 0.809 22.87 ‡ 0.706 20.87 ‡ 
Beta(INDUSTRY) 0.915 17.48 ‡ 0.975 19.50 ‡ 1.039 21.73 ‡ 
log(Total Volatility) 0.458 4.92 ‡ 0.453 5.90 ‡ 0.586 7.26 ‡ 
          
Other Controls YES   YES   YES   
          
Industry fixed effects YES   YES   YES   
Firm-clustered s.e. YES   YES   YES   
          
N 1,515   1,521   1,515   
Adjusted-R2 0.462   0.493   0.345   
          
Note: Regressions use 3 years (2003, 2004 and 2005) of data to estimate the following model for 3 
restatement portfolios: SYNCHi,t = α0 + β1ADOPT + β2Beta(MARKET)  + β3Beta(INDUSTRY) +  β4log(Total 
Volatility) + β5Log(NREV) + β6ADOPT*Log(NREV) + β7INSTIT + β8ADOPTi*INSTITi + β9MCAP + 
β10MTB + β11LEVERAGE + β12AGE + β13HERF + β14Log(NIND) + β15GDPG + β16ACCESS  + γj ∑INDj   
+ εi,t.  For reasons of brevity, we do not report coefficients on control variables other than market and 
industry characteristics. Firms in the SMALL, MEDIUM, and LARGE restatements portfolio reflect the 
bottom third, middle third, and top third, respectively, of the restatement measured as the absolute value of 
2004 local GAAP earnings per share (EPS) minus the reconciled 2004 IFRS EPS, scaled by local EPS (i.e., 
|(EPSLOCAL04 - EPSIFRS04)/ EPSLOCAL04|. Regressions contain industry-fixed effects (1 digit) and standard 
errors are clustered at the firm-level (Petersen 2009).  All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Significance 





Appendix 1: Variable definitions 
 
















R , where R2 is the coefficient of determination obtained 
from the firm-year estimation of the model:   
 
  RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w + β2MARETi,w-1  + εi,w                   (1) 
 
 where  MARET is the value-weighted market return and I, w are 
firm and week subscripts  
 












R , where R2 is the coefficient of determination obtained 
from the firm-year estimation of the industry-augmented market 
model:   
 
  RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w + β2MARETi,w-1  + εi,w                   (2) 
 
 where  MARET is the value-weighted market return,  INDRET is 
the industry value-weighted return using all firms with the same 
two-digit code, and subscripts i, and w represent a firm and a 
week.   
 












R , where R2 is the coefficient of determination obtained 
from the firm-year estimation of the Fama-French 3-factor model:   
 
  RETi,w = α + β1MARETi,w + β1SMBi w + β1HMLi,w + εi,w             (3) 
 where MARET is the value-weighted market return,  SMB  (small minus 
big) and HML  (high minus low) are the weekly returns on zero-
investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size 
and book-to-market effects, respectively, and subscripts i, and w 








Test and Control Variables 
 
ADOPT  Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 2005 fiscal-year 
(mandatory IFRS adoption year) and 0 otherwise. 
 
POST_ADOPT  Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm observation is from 2006 or later 
fiscal-year (Post-mandatory IFRS adoption year) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Beta(MARKET) Firm-year specific market beta estimated (weekly returns). [Datastream] 
 
Beta(INDUSTRY) Firm-year specific industry beta (2-digit SIC) estimated (weekly returns). 
[Datastream] 
 
Beta(HML) Beta coefficient associated with book-to-market factor in Fama-French 
(1996) three-factor model. [Bekaert et al. 2009] 
 
Beta(SMB) Beta coefficient associated with size factor in Fama-French (1996) 3 
factor model. [Bekaert et al. 2009] 
 
Total Volatility Standard deviation of weekly market return. [Datastream] 
 
Log(NREV) Natural log of number of analyst revisions of one-year ahead forecast of 
annual earnings for the calendar year. [IBES detailed files] 
 
INSTIT  Proportion (expressed as a percentage) of institutional holdings in a firm 
where institutions are defined as ‘pension funds; mutual funds; and 
insurance companies.’ [Amadeus] 
 
MCAP Market value of equity of the firm, measured at fiscal year-end. 
[Datastream] 
 
MTB Market-to-Book ratio [Datastream] 
 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt divided by (total debt plus shareholders’ equity) 
[Worldscope] 
 
AGE Number of years since the firm’s initial listing date [Datastream] 
 
HERF  A revenue-based Herfindahl index of industry-level concentration. 
[Worldscope] 
 
Log(NIND) Natural log of average number of firms used to calculate the weekly 
industry-level return index. [Worldscope] 
 
GDPG Inflation-adjusted country growth in gross domestic product [World 
Bank 2008] 
 
ACCESS The ease with which firms can raise capital through public equity 
markets. Scores are expressed as a number varying between 0 (very hard) 
and 7 (very easy). Values are for 2004 and vary between a minimum of 
3.74 (Greece) and a maximum of 6.34 (France). [World Bank 2006] 
